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A team at Royal Holloway University of London was commissioned to run a short consultation programme on behalf of The Department for Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport (DCMS) on the topic of digital identity. DCMS commissioned a programme 
of 4 consultation sessions to be undertaken with groups who are dependent on 
digital identities for use with essential, core services such as finance, welfare, health, 
housing and education. These services may be delivered both by government and by 
commercial entities. Each consultation session was split into two parts: 1) Everyday 
experiences of digital identity and the challenges faced when managing digital identity; 
and 2) Requirements for future digital identity schemes. 
The purpose of the consultation is to provide a snapshot of how digital identities are 
part of everyday lived experiences and to provide input on the design of future digital 
identity schemes. These consultations are part of the wider call for evidence from 
DCMS on the topic of digital identity. This report summary highlights the main points. 
Following on from the report summary, the findings are presented in the main body of 
the report together with the reports produced after each consultation session.
  In summary, digital identity is something that people encounter in their everyday 
lives, most routinely so if people are dependent on essential core services for their 
welfare. The consultation sessions revealed that it was not uncommon for people to 
need help to manage their digital identities. Such help might come from professionals 
working in support services or from friends and family providing more informal help. 
From an identity service perspective, such third-party support can be regarded as a 
form of social proxy.
 During the sessions there were frustrations expressed about the design and use 
of digital identities in everyday lives. In particular there were frustrations over what was 
required in terms of proof of identity: how often they had to prove their identity, in what 
format they had to provide that proof, and variability on what constitutes proof.
 There were also frustrations expressed about the language used around digital 
identity - which was felt to be too difficult and too technical for some. This can be a 
problem both for native English speakers and for those for whom English is not a first 
language. 
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Due to COVID-19 restrictions, the consultation sessions were held remotely via Zoom. In order to retain the everyday 
detail of each session regarding the complexity of digital identity set-up and use, sketch-notes were made by Claude 
Heath. All the illustrations in this report are taken from the visual notes made during the consultation sessions.
Report Summary
 The cost of proof was too high for some: the cost of a passport or of a 
provisional driving licence, the cost of printing documents, the cost accessing copies of 
documentation such as birth certificates. The technological costs of accessing digital 
identity services were also too high for some: the cost of the technology needed and 
the cost of connectivity.
 The digitalisation of services had left many feeling unsure of how to access 
essential services and frustrated by the lack of help and support on offer from the 
service providers. This lack of support left some participants describing the digital 
services as adversarial and a cause of great stress. 
 It was felt digital identity systems could also be too rigid and not have the 
flexibility to recognise the varied status and roles of individuals. For example, very often 
individuals caring for a sibling are not able to have their caring role reflected in the set-
up of their sibling’s digital identities. 
 Despite these challenges, participants recognised the value of a digital identity 
scheme that could be universally applied to all essential services. However, such a 
scheme, it was felt, would only be successful if it was designed so as to not dis-benefit 
people with limited capabilities and limited resources. Each participant group, in 
their different ways, reflected on their hopes and aspirations for future digital identity 
schemes. All groups coalesced around the following hopes:
A digital identity scheme that works for the people, not the people work for the digital 
identity scheme.
A digital identity scheme that respects a person’s rights and that is accessible to all.
A digital identity scheme that enables a person to have autonomy and control over 
their own identity.
 To realise such hopes, we perhaps might need to rethink how we design digital 
services, so that we are able to identify the relationship such services have to the roles 
people carry out in their everyday lives. This may result in a conceptualisation of digital 
identity that is not based on a single technology but, instead, a collection of identity 
tools and processes embedded within the naturally occurring support structures in 
people’s everyday lives, and over which people have both autonomy and control. The 
value of such a digital identity scheme is more naturally framed by the benefits people 
realise from the service access that it enables, rather than solely from the efficiency 
gains such technology makes possible.
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The Royal Holloway University of London team:
Lizzie Coles-Kemp and Claude Heath from Royal Holloway University of London undertook this work. Lizzie 
Coles-Kemp is part of Royal Holloway’s Information Security Group; she is a researcher who works with 
groups often regarded as marginalised or under-served, to better understand how technology can be used to 
improve the safety and security of such groups. Claude Heath is a researcher on the StoryFutures project at 
Royal Holloway’s Department of Media Arts, researching how risk can be perceptualised immersively, within 
the creative media industry and in wider society.
Claude and Lizzie have worked together since 2012 engaging with groups in Australia, Belgium, England 
and Wales to draw out the everyday experiences of interacting with digital technology and services,  and to 
capture hopes and aspirations for secure digital futures. They produced a series of booklets on the practices 
of everyday security (https://bookleteer.com/collection.html?id=28) which is featured in NCSC’s You Shape 
Security guidance (https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/you-shape-security), and a report on everyday 
experiences of Internet of things (IoT), as a supplement to the Secure by Design report from DCMS.
The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) commissioned a programme of four consultations to be undertaken with groups who are dependent 
on digital identities for use of essential, core services such as finance, welfare, health, 
housing and education. The purpose of the consultation was to present the current 
lived experience of setting up and using digital identity, and to provide input on the 
design of future digital identity schemes; in particular, who should run them and how to 
make them safe, inclusive and accessible. 
 It was agreed that the consultation programme would not seek to be 
representative of society as a whole but that each consultation would provide a window 
into the lived experience, hopes and wishes of a specific group of people who are 
particularly dependent on digital identity for the accessing of core services in their 
everyday life. Each consultation  would provide a ground-up view of digital identity, and 
that would be complemented by the views of the other groups over the course of the 
consultation programme. The views of each group are presented in their own right, 
and the overarching themes from across the groups are presented in the introductory 
sections. 
 A pre-consultation activity was undertaken to identify groups willing to participate 
and to design the format of the consultation sessions. These initial contacts made 
during the pre-consultation phase revealed that, while useful, digital identity is, for 
many, an abstract notion that is difficult to articulate. It was therefore decided that 
digital identity, for the purposes of the consultation programme, would be better 
defined as “proving who you are on-line.”
The pre-engagement phase revealed that people have rich experiences of managing digital identity in their everyday lives and that many also have strong views as to 
what a future digital identity scheme might look like. As a result, each consultation 
session was split into two parts: 1) Everyday experiences of digital identity and the 
challenges faced when managing digital identity 2) Requirements for future digital 
identity schemes. 
 Due to COVID restrictions, the consultation sessions were held via Zoom. 
Given the on-line medium and the abstract nature of the topic, it was decided that 
the sessions would need to be as simple as possible. The risk with running a session 
in this way is that the consultation might lose the details about the complexity of 
everyday life into which the digital identity was being set-up and managed. To offset 
this risk, it was agreed that one of the RHUL team, Claude Heath, would visually 
illustrate the session using a form of visual note-taking. Excerpts from the visual 
notes are used throughout the summary sections to give texture and framing to the 
concept of digital identity - in a bid to highlight the different and often complex ways in 
which digital identity is woven into everyday life. The visualisations also highlight the 
particularities implied by the phrase “particularly dependent on digital identity.” They 
show what happens when digital identity processes do not work as expected, when 
they are inaccessible or unusable or do not align well with the circumstances in which 
people find themselves using digital identity.
 
 The session structure for each consultation was as follows:
* Introduction to the consultation and re-statement of consultation goals.
* Statement of the ethics policy and re-statement of the agreement to participate.
 
 There then followed a semi-structured group discussion using the following 
discussion prompts:
1. Explain specific examples of digital identity, where you have supported    
 people to apply for a digital identity and the barriers and challenges that   
 have arisen.
2. Run through additional scenarios of where digital identity might be used.
3. Discuss the potential benefits and challenges of having one digital identity.
 
 Once each session was completed, notes were written up and sent back to the 
session’s participants for comments and review. The session notes were then turned 
into a report. The consultation reports can be found at the end of this report. 
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Recruitment and Participants
Participants were recruited through an existing community group network. Lizzie Coles-Kemp has worked with community groups across the UK since 2008 on the 
topic of digital participation and digital safety and security. Through her network, she 
recruited groups who are particularly dependent on digital identity schemes for access 
to essential services. The small size of the consultation programme means that the 
results from this consultation programme cannot be regarded as representative of UK 
society as a whole. However, participation in the 4 consultation sessions were recruited 
in such a way that there is a representation of a wide range of dependencies on digital 
identity and on essential service providers from the public and private sectors. The 
groups also represent a range of socio-economic contexts.
 The following groups took part in this consultation programme in five 
consultation sessions: 
1. Matthew’s Hub: a third sector organisation that supports vulnerable neuro-diverse 
 people from aged 13 to 70+. 
2. Cornerhouse (Yorkshire): an organisation supporting children and young people  
 with a focus on emotional and sexual health and wellbeing.
3. North Bank Forum: is a voluntary and community sector umbrella organisation  
 based in Hull and operating across Yorkshire and the Humber.
4. Sibs: a charity supporting those with siblings who are disabled. 
5. CIAC: a registered charity that supports emerging communities to contribute fully  
 to life in the UK as committed and active citizens.
6. Intergenerational Group of four participants, who between them represented all 
the dependencies on digital identity that were identified across the other five groups. 
 Groups 1-3 are reported in the report titled ‘Hull’s Voluntary and Community 
Report’, while the other groups have their 
own separate reports.
 All participation took place 
following the research ethics policy at 
Royal Holloway University of London.
  Consent was confirmed at the 
start of each consultation session and 
was re-confirmed again as part of the 
report writing stage. The reports from 
each session are included in the overall 
report with permission. All illustrations 
are published under a Creative 
Commons licence and are owned by 
Claude Heath. 
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Everyday Experiences of Digital Identity
Across the participant groups, the main contexts in which digital identity currently occurs are: set-up and use of a bank account, book a doctor’s appointment, order 
prescribed medicine, claim welfare, apply and pay for housing or apply for a grant 
or a loan. The main criticism of digital identity in all these contexts boiled down to 
the observation that digital identity and the uses of such identities are designed for a 
particular profile of technology user. For those who fall outside of that profile digital 
identity is not a benefit but a hurdle to be overcome to gain access to the services that 
are essential in everyday life.
 The sessions showed that digital identity only “makes sense” when it is 
discussed in terms of what a digital identity can “do” for an individual. Whilst the 
process of setting up a digital identity is a bureaucratic activity in its own right, the 
majority of the discussions revolved around digital identity in use. A digital identity is 
used to enable a person to gain access to a service where gaining access was talked 
about in terms of the benefits that were realised through access. From the perspective 
of the participants there were three main digital identity processes at work: (1). 
Verifying an individual’s identity in order to set-up a digital identity; (2). Gaining access 
to a service; (3). Finding ways to overcome the obstacles posed by a digital identity. 
Verification of an individual’s identity - digital identity set-up:
 Many of the challenges that participants experienced when setting up a digital 
identity to be used with core (essential) services relate to having the necessary 
evidence for verification. In every session, the challenges of not having the correct 
records in the right format were a feature of every discussion about everyday 
experiences of digital identity. Another challenge experienced by participants related 
to the costs associated with acquiring formal documentation and the challenges of 
keeping that documentation to hand. Many of the participants cared for people who 
have complex lives and limited resources and capabilities with which to manage 
identity documentation.
 Participants raised the problem of navigating the on-line processes through 
which to undertake identity verification. The language used by such services was 
too unfamiliar for many and the requirements and verification policies often seemed 
conflicting and unnecessarily complex. In addition, the design of the technological 
services was often not sufficiently robust, or sufficiently easy to use, and as a result 
it was often difficult for people to complete the verification process. Verification 
processes typically require a particular sequencing of tasks that can be difficult 
for people to grasp and are particularly difficult to complete when an individual 
is unconfident or under pressure. In the first two sessions, it was highlighted that 
verification processes can also be challenging for neuro-diverse people who struggle to 
follow the sequencing of identity verification tasks. 
 5
 6
 Participants were at pains to point out that different people experience different 
challenges when setting up and managing a digital identity and that these challenges 
often combined to make certain aspects of identity set-up and management 
particularly difficult. Examples were given of where young people, particularly those 
in care or those with little access to parental support, might struggle to prove their 
identity because they do not have access to the necessary paperwork. In such cases 
young people needed to arrange for people to vouch for them, which can be complex 
to arrange. Further examples were given of how elderly people may not have access to 
proof of identity (in comparison to a person who is of working age) due to the fact that 
a person’s need for a driver’s licence and passport can decline as they get older and as 
their children take over the management of bills and other financial matters. 
 In each session, many examples were given of where the verification process 
had failed and how, at that point, the digitalisation of services meant that there was 
nowhere to obtain help. Each consultation group revealed that it is not uncommon for 
someone to help another person with their identity management activities - either as 
an act of support and friendship, or in a role of caring or as part of a job. Often such 
support could be seen as a shared model of care - whether formal or informal. The 
community and voluntary sector groups who took part in this consultation programme 
often gave examples of providing support for people to set up and manage digital 
identities via an intermediary - such as a friend or family member.
 Once an identity is set-up, further challenges were experienced when trying to 
keep that identity safe; particularly when people are using a shared device, have limited 
access to a computer or a phone, or keeping paper copies of identity details.
Gaining access to a service:
 For each participant group, gaining access to a service using a digital identity 
was talked about in terms of realising the benefits of a service, and not in terms of the 
steps taken to access a service. For example, the aim of accessing on-line banking is 
to be able to manage money, and to make and receive payments. Online banking and 
the role of digital identities were therefore most often talked about in terms of what the 
digital identity was used for. The value of a digital identity was measured in terms of the 
degree to which that identity facilitated the gaining of access. Examples were given in 
every session of where a digital identity did not result in service access being acheived, 
and the stress that ensued as a result of being denied access. For example, for some 
participants whilst the NHS number that each British citizen has is a clear example of 
a unique identifier, it does not, on its own, grant access to health services. It was felt 
by some that the problem of health service access is exacerbated by the introduction 
of digital health services as the relevant health information about a person is not 
necessarily made available through an individual’s NHS number. This is information 
Everyday Experiences of Digital Identity
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that participants argued should already be on the system and identifiable through an 
individual’s NHS number. 
 Digital identities that are not designed to support contexts of use therefore 
become a hurdle that has to be overcome in order to gain access to a service that is 
needed. This often leaves residual security worries and concerns when people are 
using a digital identity. These include:
Who can view my identity?
Who can view what I do with my identity?
What have I signed up for?
Whom can I ask for help? 
Finding ways to overcome obstacles posed by a digital identity:
 The sessions revealed that digital identities are not always a perfect fit for 
everyday life, a life that is often messy and does not fit neatly into the pre-set patterns 
of practice that digital services are designed to expect. The mismatch often boils down 
to the fact that digital services are built upon a model of a particular social structure 
that is often too narrowly defined. When people are in circumstances or operating in 
such a way that does not fit the expected social structure, problems can occur with 
accessing services using a digital identity. An example was given of the difficulty of 
managing two bank accounts (an individual’s account and the account of someone 
they look after) at the same bank from one mobile phone. This was due to the two-
factor authentication for the access control process not being designed to recognise 
this as a legitimate access scenario.
 Digital identities in current use are not typically designed to be shared or to 
be used by a third party - and yet this was a frequently occurring scenario described 
in all of the consultation sessions. The lack of flexibility of systems in recognising 
different social structures partly stems from the design of the technology, but 
more fundamentally can be traced back to ambiguities in the underlying policy and 
regulation. For example, those caring for a disabled brother or sister very often found 
that their role as a social proxy managing digital identity and digital service access on 
behalf of their brother or sister was not recognised - or only partially recognised. The 
initial ambiguity stems from grey areas in the rules relating to power of attorney and the 
interpretation of capacity. This ambiguity means that there is limited provision for the 
social proxy role in the digital identity and service design, and as a result, the actions of 
a social proxy can be misinterpreted under anti-money laundering rules or under anti-
terrorism rules. This makes it very difficult for someone to manage a bank account, 
claim welfare, or manage housing on behalf of their disabled brother or sister. 
Everyday Experiences of Digital Identity
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Essential core services in health, banking, welfare and housing are central to an individual’s security and safety. They keep people safe and provide a platform 
from which people can safely and securely contribute to society. All our participants 
reflected upon how such core services were becoming increasingly digitalised, and that 
they increasingly required the use of digital identities. When digital identities were lost 
or were found to be difficult to set-up, many examples were given of where people felt 
pushed into potentially risky behaviours and compromising situations as a result of this 
difficulty. For example, people might turn to a friend or to family member to informally 
carry out identity set-up and management tasks on their behalf. This happens the world 
over: sometimes the reasons are cultural, sometimes it is because of the dynamics 
within a family set-up; sometimes it is because the process is too complex or the 
language too unfamiliar, or because there is little or no access to the technical or 
connectivity resources that are necessary. In many cases it is because an individual 
lacks the confidence to engage with the bureaucratic system and decides that relying 
on a trusted friend or family member feels like a safer option for them. 
 Whilst allowing an informal third party to act as a social proxy when setting up 
and managing a digital identity is usually against the policies of digital identity use, it is 
nevertheless seen by some as a relatively safe way to proceed. Participants gave clear 
examples of where people are left vulnerable if they have to manage digital identities 
on their own. For example, older people were felt to be particularly vulnerable to being 
scammed. Examples were also given of where people go without essential services 
because they are unable to set up and manage a digital identity. Whilst being a social 
proxy is often a supportive act, it puts the legal owner of the identity into a vulnerable 
position in cases where things go wrong with the management of the digital identity: 
either because the social proxy does not fully complete the tasks, or completes them 
incorrectly, or because the social proxy loses or does not look after the personal data 
that has been handed over. In addition, the social proxy might be malicious and use 
someone else’s personal data for fraud. It also potentially puts the social proxy in a 
vulnerable position, because they might be open to accusations of fraud that they can’t 
disprove, even if not true. 
 Here the security problem is clear: for some the involvement of an informal third 
party results in manipulation, while for others the involvement of an informal third party 
offers access to a form of control and autonomy that an individual does not have if 
they try to manage a digital identity by themselves. To date, security technologies often 
struggle to differentiate between these two scenarios, and in the meantime people find 
themselves taking up risky and informal identity management practices for which they 
are afforded little protection.
 Poor choices in service design or a failure to resolve ambiguities or tensions in 
underlying policies and procedures can exacerbate these tensions and push people 
towards these riskier situations. One of the core failures in design, from the perspective 
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of the participants, was the lack of available support while using the digital processes 
and identity systems, and moreover, a lack of support when things do indeed go wrong. 
Time and again participants emphasised the importance of being able to talk to 
someone. It was strongly argued that better designed digital systems and the provision 
of support that was usable and helpful would reduce security risks of scamming or 
inadequate support from a social proxy.
Digital Identity - Futures
 All the participants could see the potential benefits of a universal digital identity 
scheme, but all participants were very aware of the dangers and concerned about 
further loss of autonomy and control. In the current situation, there are many problems 
with digital identity systems. Resolving these problems in such a way that access to 
essential services was improved and made more effective, would be welcome for 
many. 
 When the groups talked about digital identity futures, they talked about it in one 
of two ways: principles and implementation.
  Principles:
◊ Identity services must be transparent. 
◊ The eligibility rules for a digital identity must be clear and fair. 
◊ There must be clear accountability for the digital identity scheme.
◊ If it goes wrong or problems occur, it must be clear whose responsibility it is   
 to fix the system. 
◊ An identity scheme must not be imposed on people but only rolled out by   
 consent.
Implementation:
◊ The design of the digital identity scheme must be co-designed with as diverse  
 a group across society as possible. This includes the processes of governance  
 and accountability. 
◊ An identity must be reliable, consistent and usable by a wide cross-section of   
 society. 
◊ The rules of data use must be clear, transparent and fair, and support the   
 rights of the individual.
◊ A digital identity system must be secure. 
◊ Effective help must be available if users of a digital identity system encounter   
 problems. 
 Two of the consultation sessions explored the idea of a modular digital identity 
scheme. This has basic digital identity services for all at its core but allows for 
additional identity services on top that could be adopted by those in society who need 
them.
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During the study’s preparation phase, the pre-study feedback clearly showed that people largely find digital identity to be a concept that is difficult to relate to 
and hard to define. During the consultation sessions it emerged that people have 
strong feelings about digital identity, the role it plays in their lives, and the hopes and 
aspirations that they have for future digital identity schemes. This was often a surprise 
to the participants, many of whom had not previously reflected on the role of digital 
identity in their everyday lives. However, these feelings only emerged when people 
talked about digital identity in the context of their everyday lives, and in the contexts of 
the purposes for which it is used. 
 The groups that took part in the consultation programme all relied on digital 
identities to receive services that are essential to their everyday lives and/or to the lives 
of people to whom they provided community and support services. Having established 
that digital identity is an important issue, participants systematically worked through 
the different examples of digital identity that they have experienced as part of access 
to essential, core services, examining in some detail the barriers and challenges that 
they encountered in the current state of affairs.
 Perhaps as a consequence of this reflection, participants went on to consider 
what a future digital identity scheme might look like - and to suggest principles on 
which such a scheme might be founded. In this part of the session, each group, in 
their different ways, reflected on their hopes and aspirations for future digital identity 
systems. All groups coalesced around the following hopes:
A digital identity scheme that works for the people, not the people work for the digital 
identity scheme.
A digital identity scheme that respects a person’s rights and that is accessible to all. 
A digital identity scheme that enables a person to have autonomy and control over 
their own identity.
 Whilst privacy was not directly discussed by the groups, the need for a person 
to have autonomy and control over their own identity was discussed. The discussions 
circled the question of who or what has access to an identity, and who has access 
to the information generated from it. This question has a direct bearing on the desire 
that participants have for autonomy and control, as they envisaged it in a future digital 
identity scheme. Their future of digital identity implies autonomy and control, and 
privacy stemming from the use of the future digital identity.
 
 For these hopes and aspirations to be realised, digital identity needs to be 
understood not solely as a piece of technology but as a toolkit of technologies and 
processes that are designed for a wide spectrum of capabilities. There must also be 
an acknowledgement that many groups and individuals find themselves with limited 
resources to successfully use digital systems. It is also important that any future 
digital identity scheme is designed with (rather than for) as broad a cross-section of 
society as possible. By co-designing digital identity in this way, it will become apparent 
that a usable system means different things to different parts of society, and that a 
combination of good digital design and accessible in-person support will increase the 
likelihood that a digital identity scheme will be successful. 
Concluding Comments
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A team at Royal Holloway University of London was commissioned to run a short consultation programme on behalf of The Department for Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport (DCMS) on the topic of digital identity. DCMS commissioned a programme 
of 4 consultation sessions to be undertaken with groups who are dependent on digital 
identities for use with essential, core services such as finance, welfare, health, housing 
and education. The purpose of the consultation was to provide input on the design of 
future digital identity schemes; in particular, who should run them and how to make 
them safe, inclusive and accessible. These consultations are part of a wider call by 
DCMS for evidence on the topic of digital identity. 
 Each consultation session was split into two parts: (1). Everyday experiences 
of digital identity and the challenges faced when managing digital identity, and (2). 
Requirements for future digital identity schemes.
 Due to COVID restrictions, the consultation sessions were held via Zoom. In order 
to retain the details about the complexity of digital identity set-up and use in everyday 
life, Claude Heath visually illustrated the session using visual note-taking. 
Participants: Hull’s Voluntary and Community Sector
 This report is the product of two consultations that took place with 
representatives from the following third sector groups in Hull: Matthew’s Hub, North 
Bank Forum and Cornerhouse.
 Two representatives from Matthew’s Hub: one speaking in her capacity as lead 
for Matthew’s Hub and from a background in healthcare and safeguarding and one 
in her capacity of service manager at Matthew’s Hub. Matthew’s Hub is a third sector 
organisation that supports vulnerable neuro-diverse people from aged 13 to 70+. 
 One representative from North Bank Forum speaking from both the perspective 
of primary care and BAME support. North Bank Forum is a voluntary and community 
sector umbrella organisation based in Hull and operating across Yorkshire and the 
Humber.
 One representative from Cornerhouse (Yorkshire) is an organisation supporting 
children and young people with a focus on emotional and sexual health and wellbeing. 
 The views expressed are those of this participant group.
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Much of the work of all three organisations is to advocate and to facilitate access to core services on behalf of other people. Digital identity management can be a part 
of that work, particularly in respect to setting up access to digital services for welfare, 
banking and housing. For example, Matthew’s Hub currently has circa 800 contacts 
per week (not necessarily from different people but 800 calls that require follow-up 
or action). A lot of the work generated by these calls is to help neuro-diverse adults 
navigate core services. 
 North Bank Forum highlighted how digital identity is often a core aspect of 
access to primary care. For example, to get repeat prescriptions you have to prove who 
you are. In particular, not having a driving licence or passport (Photo ID) is a problem. 
If someone is struggling with anxiety, this challenge can make them more anxious. In 
everyday digital identity management there is a fear about where the information is 
going as well as a fear of missing out if you don’t have a digital identity and access. 
 Within families, the need to access digital services can mean that you are relying 
on a young person to help you set-up and use a digital identity. Shared access may take 
place because older members in a household have simpler phones with less access 
to data. Shared access may be problematic if the younger person is not willing to 
share their data. This manner of shared access can also be a problem for healthcare 
because there may be things that the older members of the household does not want to 
share with a younger person in a family. In addition, the language that is used in digital 
access can be complicated or confusing and this can be made worse when the older 
person has to go through a young person as a third party. 
 The above problems are also seen by youth services when they are advocating on 
behalf of a young person: Having the right information to prove who you are as a young 
person (particularly if you have been through the care system) can be problematic 
and there can be a delay in getting access to information because you cannot prove 
who you are. Examples were given of having to find ways round no photo id for young 
people or young people not having a birth certificate. This would include sourcing 
letters needed from social workers and/or teachers. 
 Across all three organisations, the digital identity challenges experienced by their 
communities come from several sources: insufficient access to technology, data and 
internet; difficulties in understanding how to navigate the services and what data is 
required; lack of access to the right paperwork and proof of identity.  
 Representatives from Matthew’s Hub highlighted that their members consult 
them about access to core services but not to services such as gaming and other less 
formal services. It was felt that gaming is a grey zone where people might actively 
avoid the use of a central, government sanctioned identity. Gaming also introduces 
the notion of multiple identities and for some people multiple identities help with 
safeguarding by enabling them to control who they come into contact with and when. 
In the digital realm, there are many examples of where young people choose another 
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identity and they want to be recognised for that new identity. Young people also have 
multiple identities on-line and they want to be able to inhabit those different identities. 
 Digital identity is used by some more than others which means some encounter 
more hurdles to using digital identity than others, it was argued. In the case of 
healthcare, more frequent and routine  use of digital identity is part of some health 
conditions. For example, if you have diabetes, you might have to re-new your driving 
licence every three years which is now typically carried out on-line and is complicated 
to do without a passport to verify who you are. 
 All three organisations concurred that the requirements for proving you are 
who you say you are often have economic costs (cost of a passport, driving licence 
and replacement birth certificate). It can often include the economic cost of needing 
to have a fixed abode through the requirement of proving the address of your 
accommodation. They also require that you have to know how to navigate identity 
services and understand what they mean. For groups with low levels of literacy, low 
levels of confidence and who are experiencing high levels of stress, navigation of such 
services might be difficult.
 The consultation group saw the dependence on digital technology as a barrier 
to using digital identities. If technology is to be used to prove who you are, there is the 
potential for people to become too dependent on the technology and this is a problem 
if the technology fails. If people have to be dependent on technology, they may feel that 
big brother is watching and that it is a form of control, with the result that they won’t 
use it. 
 The three organisations represent a broad spectrum of groups and communities. 
During the session they frequently gave examples of what constitutes unreasonable 
third party use of digital identity is different for different people. The group highlighted 
that whilst the barriers and challenges to accessing and using digital identities look 
different to different people, the cause and effect are the same (e.g; socioeconomic 
barriers). Proving your identity can involve so many peripherals (for example passport, 
smartphone) and these all have costs associated with them which can act as a barrier 
for many groups. It was also pointed out that mobile phones are a form of currency and 
can be bought and sold at the end of the month to pay bills; a high-tech phone carrying 
ID also becomes a prime target for theft. 
 Digital identity also assumes digital access; families and individuals do not 
always have access to the internet. Even if there is a WIFI service, the access can 
change from week to week; for some it comes down to a choice between paying for 
gas (for cooking and heating) or wifi and gas will usually win.
 It was agreed that introducing a digital identity scheme will be difficult 
because there is always a mistrust of anything new and there is always worry that 
the information will not get to the right people. The participants outlined some of the 
challenges for a future scheme. 
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Challenges:
 The group felt that having a single digital identity when it works would be 
amazing but very problematic when it doesn’t work.
One of the key challenges is who owns and manages the identity. In some of the 
participants’ experience, many of the problems come when people do not own or 
control their own identifiers. An example of the power of controlling your identity can be 
found in maternity care where the women undergoing pre-natal care control their own 
identity and the data associated with it. 
 Another challenge is differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate use 
of an identity; an identity is something that can be used to hide behind and there 
is the potential for someone’s digital identity to be used for another person’s gain. 
For example, one person’s digital identity can be used by another to gain access to 
someone else, to generate debt in someone else’s name as a form of coercion, or to 
commit other forms of domestic abuse. 
 The cost of accidental loss is also a challenge. Having a formal form of digital 
identity could be expensive and the cost if you lose it is significant. Having a formal 
digital identity also makes you a target of theft. The cost of an identity is only worth it 
if a). the checking of the identity is robust and fair b). you get something worth having 
in return for having the digital identity. There also has to be a robust way to retrieve a 
digital identity if it is lost. 
 Another challenge is designing processes that meaningfully use digital identity 
in an inclusive way. It is not just about the digitial technology but that also that the 
processes for using the identity technology have to be clear and understandable.  If you 
make the digital identity scheme technology-based (e.g. store it in a phone or an app on 
a phone) then it has to work for all as people can feel unfairly victimised if they are not 
included. 
 A further challenge is ensuring that the digital identity has meaningful value. 
The value of the identity is what you have access to. Identity is not separate to the 
information that you have access to. Therefore: technology needs to be well-designed 
(i.e. integrated with the services that support it), trustworthy, secure (so that you can 
guarantee that the digital identity belongs to the person using that identity) and needs 
to give confidence that the information that the digital identity is used to access is not 
shared with others without permission. 
 Finally, people’s relationship to the digital identity scheme has to be healthy. A 
single digital identity might also be seen as a target, simply ‘because it is there’, and 
‘because I can’, and because hacking it is a challenge. As a society, our relationship 
with digital identity has to be re-worked so it is not seen as fair game but seen as fair 
and a valid resource for all.  
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Support:
 The three organisations provide support services to individuals and their families 
from many backgrounds.  They argued that the success of a digital identity scheme 
would hinge on support from such organisations. In particular, the messaging would 
need to be clear and the benefits would have to be precisely and simply articulated. 
It was highlighted that it would also be important to set up support (local as well as 
central) and provide clear messaging to stop people being scammed. 
 Support from the Voluntary and Community Sector is important if non-
compliance and misuse of a future digital identity scheme is to be reduced. It was 
acknowledged by the participants that some people will always try to twist the scheme/
hack technology. If the digital identity scheme is mandatory and universal – some 
will always try to hack it. However, some of that risk can be reduced with education, 
messaging and ensuring that there is genuine benefit to using the technology. 
 The digital identity scheme and services must be simple and clear to use, not be 
dependent on particular technologies or on other people.
Possible Future Schemes: 
 All participants agreed that a digital identity scheme that removed a lot of the 
current challenges would be beneficial. The participants suggested a multi-layer 
or modular digital identity which started as a core identity that provided access to 
essential services. Each additional layer of the identity might offer a greater level of 
functionality but would also be more complex to manage. Those who need simple 
access to only a few core services would have a simpler identity to manage, this would 
mean less bureaucracy. Examples of core services would be bill payment, library 
access and travel. 
 How might such a scheme work? For example: a ‘basic’ or core digital identity 
might be used for shopping bank utilities, then scale up to a standard identity (basic 
plus gaming and leisure) and then an enhanced identity (basic, standard and bespoke/
overseas). It could be stored in a (digital) ‘wallet’ and be used with a ‘pick and mix’ 
menu with different types of service access. 
 For such a future scheme to be successful there must be a guarantee that 
the technology and processes are secure. There must also be a guarantee that the 
individual has control. Any identity scheme has to be seen as fair with clearly identified 
responsibilities and accountability. 
 
Future Digital Identity Scheme -
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 Another possible future scheme is to use an NHS number. British citizens are 
typically given an NHS number. For those born in Britain this is given at birth. Yet, how 
many times do we actually use our NHS number? Why is this not used more widely 
throughout life, as a consistent identity marker from birth? There are shared care 
models, that already exist and that people may find acceptable as a basis for a digital 
identity scheme.
Visual Note:
 The visual note  on the next page shows how all the issues described in this 
report overlap with each other. The visual note also shows that the following questions 
were frequently considered when talking about future digital identity schemes:
Who has control? 
How do I know it is secure? 
How do I know that it is worth the money and the effort? 
What can I do if it goes wrong? 
Will I become a target for theft by having it? 
Will I be forced into a particular form of identity if I have to have one? 
Will big brother be watching me? 
 These questions must be carefully considered and the responses to them 
co-developed with the public. In order for any future digital identity scheme to be 
successful it must be recognised that different parts of society will interpret responses 
to these questions in different ways and indeed will relate to these questions in 
different ways.
Please see page 7 for the drawing by Claude Heath. This work is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. 
To view a copy of this license visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
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A team at Royal Holloway University of London was commissioned to run a short consultation programme on behalf of The Department for Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport (DCMS) on the topic of digital identity. DCMS commissioned a programme 
of 4 consultations to be undertaken with groups who are dependent on digital identities 
for use of essential, core services such as finance, welfare, health, housing and 
education. The purpose of the consultation was to provide input on the design of future 
digital identity schemes; in particular, who should run them and how to make them 
safe, inclusive and accessible. These consultations are part of a wider call by DCMS for 
evidence on the topic of digital identity. 
 Each consultation session was split into two parts: (1). Everyday experiences 
of digital identity and the challenges faced when managing digital identity, and (2). 
Requirements for future digital identity schemes.
 Due to COVID restrictions, the consultation sessions were held via Zoom. In order 
to retain the details about the complexity digital identity set-up and use in everyday life, 
Claude Heath visually illustrated the session using visual note-taking. 
 This is a report of the consultation session with representatives from the charity 
Sibs that supports those who grow up with or have grown up with a disabled brother or 
sister. The views expressed are those of this participant group.
Participants:
 The 9 participants were all members of the charity Sibs; this is a charity for those 
with brothers and sisters who are disabled. Sibs members act as advocates for their 
brothers and sisters (and potentially for other members of their family). This advocacy 
has many roles but in the digital realm largely revolves around advocating for and 
carrying out a number of core services on behalf of their sibling. Core services are 
primarily: financial services (particularly digital banking), health services (particularly 
managing PIPs, arranging hospital and GP appointments and acting as the intermediary 
between healthcare professionals and sibling), welfare (particularly welfare claiming 
and ensuring continuity of payments), day to day care (particularly managing carer’s 
teams and ensuring there is resource in place to cover carer payments and everyday 
expenses), housing and shopping.
 The participants felt largely unseen and unheard as carers and that their role in 
caring for their sibling is not formally recognised. From their experience, core services 
recognise parents, recognise partners and recognise children of those who are disabled 
but not siblings and the ramifications of being unrecognised become more profound 
as core services become increasingly digital. This is because the siblings’ invisibility 
to formal bureaucratic systems is mirrored in the digital design. It is also important to 
recognise that standards of proof and the roles of advocates are regulated differently 
across the devolved nations in the UK.
Introduction - 
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A key area where digital identity plays an important role in digital advocacy is digital banking. 2-factor authentication is particularly stressful because it assumes 
that 2-factor authentication will be for one bank account not several (at the same 
bank) and this makes banking for yourself and your sibling very difficult (and at times 
impossible). Biometric authentication can be anxiety inducing for the sibling that 
is being advocated for because it can be a complex process that is difficult to both 
explain and carry out. 
 Digital services can also make other aspects of advocacy easier and timesaving 
(for example on-line shopping) but can make aspects of advocacy more difficult 
(particularly when it comes to verifying who you are and whether your sibling needs an 
advocate and why). 
 Digital services are designed to make tasks more efficient. One of the ways that 
efficiency is achieved is by making connections between different data and these 
connections can be misinterpreted. For example, if the bank accounts of two siblings 
are connected (at the same bank), there can be assumptions that the welfare payments 
of one sibling is a form of “joint” income – making it difficult for the advocate to apply 
for loans or welfare in their own right. 
 NHS access is another area where an instance of an app linked to a phone 
number cannot be used for two people. The one phone number is a part of the digital 
identification. As a result, there are examples where the sibling cannot use the phone 
to make appointments or get test results both for themselves and for the sibling they 
care for. 
 A way round these challenges of using apps is to call the service provider – 
however, it takes a long time to phone up, queue and then have the conversation. This 
is a problem because siblings are often time pressurised. Advocacy is, in effect, a job 
that has to be worked around all of their own jobs and responsibilities – this means 
that advocates are often time-poor, emotionally exhausted and stressed. 
 The legal systems underpinning advocacy do not provide sufficient granularity 
and the notion of “capacity” is a contested concept that is treated differently by the 
various support and social services. Power of attorney is a principle that underpins 
much of how the digital identity of an individual can be accessed and used by another 
person. However, the participants were very clear that power of attorney is not a 
magic bullet. For example, power of attorney does not match to the different levels 
of advocacy. Power of attorney is expensive to access and it can be difficult to prove 
levels of capacity (for the sibling who is advocated for), particularly with someone who 
has fluctuating levels of capacity or who has never been classed as “capacitated”. This 
is further complicated by the sense that many professionals do not understand the role 
of siblings in terms of caring for a brother or sister and are sometimes more focused 
on what individuals are capacitated to do rather than what they are not. Examples were 
given where participants were left to manage unrecognised or fluctuating gaps in their 
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siblings’ capacity using digital systems that did not recognise the legitimacy of their 
role as carers. This causes considerable stress and potentially places both parties 
(sibling in caring role and sibling being cared for) in vulnerable situations.  
 When siblings act as advocates or carers they are often having to transition from 
an informal form of advocacy (formerly carried out by their parents) to a more formal, 
visible role – in part as a result of the digital. This causes additional stress. The digital 
systems have lost the intermediaries who could help with hooking the system into 
their particular model of care without stress and disruption. Chat Bots and automated 
calling systems are not able to replicate the benefits of speaking to a real person. The 
lack of intermediaries pushes the burden of support even more onto the sibling who is 
undertaking the caring role and the pressure is draining and frustrating – particularly 
as the pressure is part of a caring role that lasts for many years and is buried into other 
additional everyday stresses and demands. In addition, the feelings advocates have 
towards their siblings are complicated and often conflicted; this adds to the stress. 
 When siblings act as advocates or carers they are often having to prove and 
re-prove who they are to service providers and government agencies and that their 
intentions towards their siblings are good and not malicious. Even when you have 
powers under Power of Attorney or you have proven who you are – you still have to 
routinely re-prove who you are and why you are advocating on behalf of your sibling. 
The processes are increasingly adversarial in the sense that service providers seem 
to have switched to a default position of not believing who you are and assume you 
are intending harm. The lack of someone to talk to directly means that the complaints 
process and social media are your only means of resolving problems. This is repetitive 
and exhausting. 
 Other examples of where acting as an advocate causes problems with digital 
identity include: booking travel and booking a holiday. Booking on behalf of someone is 
difficult and it is often assumed that the advocate is the traveller not the sibling. There 
is little recourse to fix this. 
 These difficulties often result in workarounds or trying to second guess/
deconstruct the digital systems. The efficiencies and security controls have trade-offs 
and hurdles that are proving increasingly difficult to manage. Digital access seems to 
have to be agreed by committee – and whilst the responsibility sits with the advocate, 
the authority does not sit with the advocate but with a form of committee. This 
committee is often composed of other family members as well as external institutions 
and this is complex as families are often composed of complex and sometimes 
conflicted relationships. 
 One of the questions that a future digital identity scheme will need to consider is: 
how much control over a digital service is enough? Another question that is frequently 
asked is: How do you have control over your sibling’s finances but still respect a 
sibling’s autonomy? 
Future Digital Identity Scheme - 
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 Designing a future identity system with the following benefits would be desirable:
A unified common standard for proving who you are. 
Common standards for proof both of identity and of advocacy. 
Proving who you are once and to not have to repeat that process.
 In addition, the following suggestions were made:
1. Proving that you are legitimately acting on behalf of your sibling should ideally be  
 subject to standardised tests.
2. The work of siblings should be valued and treated with respect and dignity - not  
 with suspicion. Technologies or intermediary supported technologies should be  
 better at differentiating between malicious and benign motivations. 
3. Identity systems need to be able to differentiate between the granular levels of  
 guardianship and differing levels of capacity with sufficient flexibility to respond  
 to changes in situation and the subtleties of the notions of both guardianship and  
 capacity. 
4. Digital identity systems and services need to be capable of understanding that  
 people can legitimately be the holders of 2+ identities. Authentication for those  
 identity systems also need to be able to authenticate two identities tied to one  
 physical entity (e.g. phone). 
5. Identity systems and services also need to be adaptable and supportive – again  
 in recognition of the important labour that advocates do. 
6. Not only do the technologies have to be accessible and usable but so too do the  
 laws, regulations and policy systems that these technologies interface with.
Visual Note:
Please see page 6 for the full drawing by Claude Heath. This work is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 
4.0. To view a copy of this license visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
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A team at Royal Holloway University of London was commissioned to run a short consultation programme on behalf of The Department for Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport (DCMS) on the topic of digital identity. DCMS commissioned a programme 
of 4 consultations to be undertaken with groups who are dependent on digital identities 
for use of essential services such as finance, welfare, health, housing and education. 
The purpose of the consultation was to provide input on the design of future digital 
identity schemes; in particular, who should run them and how to make them safe, 
inclusive and accessible. These consultations are part of a wider call for evidence on 
the topic of digital identity. 
 Each consultation session was split into two parts: (1). Everyday experiences 
of digital identity and the challenges faced when managing digital identit, amd (2). 
Requirements for future digital identity schemes. 
 Due to COVID restrictions, the consultation sessions were held via Zoom. In order 
to retain the details about the complexity digital identity set-up and use in everyday life, 
Claude Heath, visually illustrated the session using visual note-taking. 
 This is a report of the consultation session with representatives from CIAC, an 
organisation which is OISC regulated to provide immigration advice and support. The 
views expressed are those of this participant group.
Participants - Community Integration and Advocacy Centre (CIAC):
 Four representatives from CIAC took part in this session. The representatives 
include CIAC’s Chief Executive Officer and 3 volunteers. CIAC was founded in 2017 
and is a registered charity that supports emerging communities to contribute fully 
to life in the UK as committed and active citizens. Emerging communities include 
refugees, asylum seekers, refused asylum seekers, EEA migrants and other migrants. 
CIAC also provides services to those who are victims of modern slavery and human 
trafficking. 95% of the services that CIAC provides are immigration services with 5% 
as generalist services covering welfare issues, accommodation advice, debt advice 
and asylum support, and helping people where there are difficulties in evidencing 
long term residence in the UK. Those with an income are asked to pay for the support 
received, with 25% of each payment going to a destitution fund - covering the costs of 
providing services to those who are destitute. There is also an intention to expand CIAC 
services to provide therapeutic emotional and well-being services for those suffering 
from trauma induced by forced immigration, slavery, trafficking and other life situations 
exacerbated by resettlement.
 As a guiding principle, CIAC provides services that enable people to become 
self-sufficient through realising the rights that their identity affords them. The belief 
underpinning this principle is that if people can realise the rights that they are entitled 
to, they can realise a safe and secure future. This session therefore highlighted the fact 
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that an identity has rights attached to it and any digital identity scheme has to respect 
and support those rights. The participants were very aware of the difficulties faced by 
those not attaining citizenship and once those rights are realised access to basic and 
core services becomes more realisable and less precarious. 
 Volunteers have many reasons for joining CIAC: some have an education related 
to immigration services, some have first or second-hand experience of migration 
and of the challenges of re-settling in a new land, and some have been recipients of 
support from CIAC. The participants reflect great diversity, incorporating people of Irish, 
Hungarian, Moroccan and Spanish nationalities. 
 Volunteering at CIAC is a complex and detailed process. Volunteers develops 
skills and experience related to both the very detailed, technical knowledge required 
to provide immigration services and also the human interaction skills and practices 
of care needed to successfully deliver such services. The process for learning these 
skills and acquiring these experiences is to shadow a more experienced volunteer or 
member of staff. Volunteers can also obtain formal qualifications through Office of the 
Immigration Services Commissioner. The success of CIAC is evidenced through the 
word of mouth recommendations and the volume of requests for their services. 
Everyday Experiences of Digital Identity:
 It emerged during the session that not only do volunteers need to acquire detailed 
immigration knowledge and the skills to work with people, volunteers also need to 
develop a good understanding of IT and how digital immigration services work, as 
well as the acute problems that immigrants can face when accessing digital services. 
These problems include: lack of money to access technology or the internet, limited 
English, limited formal education, low levels of IT skills and low levels of literacy. These 
problems conspire to create problems when applying for services that require a digital 
identity. 
 The clearest example of digital identity in action in the immigration services 
context is the process to apply for EU settled status. The process is entirely digital and 
requires that you (a). have access to the EU settled status app (b). have access to the 
internet (c). have access to an email address (d). have access to evidence that can 
prove that you have the right to remain in the UK under this scheme. This is a difficult 
process if the applicant does not have the following resources: 
(1) Technical and data access 
(2) A stable email address 
(3) Confident English language skills
(4) Clear evidence of British residence. 
Everyday Experiences of Digital Identity -
CIAC
 3
 Common problems for applicants relate to losing access to the email address 
to which the application is attached. This is a common problem if the email address is 
incorrectly entered, or the email address is temporary. Once the email address is lost, 
the application is extremely difficult to recover. Another problem is not completing the 
application and interrupting part-way through. It is difficult to suspend an application 
and then recommence it. A further problem is not having access to the relevant 
information to prove residency, including not having access to the passport that proves 
nationality and citizenship in the old land. The process can also become stressful if 
applicants have limited or no access to the internet, have to borrow a phone to make 
the application but then have to access their email through their own phone to confirm 
the application. 
 The EU settled status scheme is a good example of a digital-only scheme - 
issuing a purely digital identity. The participants noted that many of those applying 
for CIAC’s services prefer a physical card to prove their identity, rather than relying on 
an exclusively digital proof of identity, as the digital version is most likely to be stored 
on devices that may be too expensive and, if such a device is owned, is difficult to 
replace if lost. There is also a sense of security and safety that comes from a physical 
representation of an approved identity that many do not have with a digital proof of 
identity. 
 Digital identity schemes are typically designed on the assumption that a person’s 
name is uncontested. The immigration journey often results in changes to a person’s 
name and yet there is no consistent way, even internally within a government, as to how 
departments will treat name changes and this can cause problems when a person tries 
to prove who they are. This makes it very difficult for volunteers and the people they 
are supporting to know how to handle name changes within an identity application or 
verification process. 
 The more that the immigration services become digital, the harder and more 
expensive it becomes to resolve proof and verification issues. This is partly because 
the policy on immigration has become more hostile, and partly because the IT that 
supports digital services is either not fit for purpose, or is not usable for various 
immigrant groups. The important point to note is that a hostile policy and poorly 
designed IT have security impacts (as outlined in the following examples) that not only 
make an immigrant more vulnerable to fraud but also damage the relationship between 
the individual, their kin and friendship network and the state. These security outcomes 
have potentially adverse ramifications for the individuals and also for a state that is 
increasingly reliant on compliant digital use as a means of governing its peoples. 
 A significant barrier to immigrants successfully obtaining a digital identity is 
a lack of support when the digital identity application process goes wrong. Whilst 
telephone resolution services are sometimes offered, the calls are expensive and the 
response rate is low. If the resolution service is on-line, the service is often confusing 
Everyday Experiences of Digital Identity -
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and resolution is not guaranteed. The more digital that these services become, and 
the harder it is to access those resolution services, then immigrants turn to “friends” 
who attempt to complete the services on their behalf. Sometimes this is successful, 
sometimes not. However, it does mean that the person can lose control of their 
application, making it difficult at times to resolve issues related to an application. It 
also increases the likelihood of identity fraud because valuable information that proves 
who a person is, is handed over to another person. The view was put forward that 
identity fraud is more likely to come from within the community. It was also viewed as 
a strong possibility that digital identity schemes will increase the likelihood of identity 
fraud if the digital identity schemes are difficult to access, and have costs attached 
to them, because people will be forced to rely on informal help - and this makes them 
vulnerable. 
 One particular area of potential digital identity fraud is the scenario where those 
who are trafficking people from the EU, use the EU settled status scheme to apply in the 
name of those who are being trafficked and/or enslaved, either through manipulation 
or through the threat of violence. Once the digital identities come through, they can be 
used for nefarious activities by those running the slavery and trafficking schemes.
 The participants noted that as the immigration environment has become more 
hostile, the digital immigration services and the associated identity verification services 
have also become more hostile. It has become harder to navigate these processes, 
and less support is available via digital means. There is a very strong sense that digital 
services are being used to police the borders from within the country, and that an 
applicant has to prove that they have rights, and that they are not trying to defraud the 
system. Increasingly this proof comes via digital means (e.g. biometrics) and yet the 
digital means of proof cost money, money that applicants often do not have. Even for 
free immigration services, the digital proof is charged for, and the charging is enforced 
by digital means. The logistics and administration related to arranging digital proof is 
also expensive (which for example includes travel). This is not designed to support or 
accommodate the particular precarities that immigrants and their families often face 
(money, time, language, technical ability for instance). The CIAC volunteers often find 
themselves trying to reduce the adverse impacts on immigrants of poorly designed 
technology, complex processes and conflicting rules. 
 There is a concern that digital identity will mean greater surveillance. One 
example was given in relation to the ASPEN card - a digital payment card that relates to 
asylum seekers in receipt of asylum support under Sections 95/4 of the Asylum Act.. 
This was reported to be used to track where immigrants, who are in receipt of ASPEN 
payments, travel to, spend their money, and can be used to identify what they spend 
their money. It is important to note that regardless of whether surveillance is intended 
or not, in the context of a digital identity scheme, the experiences related to the ASPEN 
card will mean that it is likely that surveillance will be assumed by some groups of 
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immigrants. This means that a digital identity will have a different symbolic power 
for different groups. A comparison with the Spanish identity scheme was given: the 
Spanish system is partially digital and it was suggested that the way that the system is 
perceived, depends on how vulnerable a group feels within society, and upon the type of 
relationship that the group has with the state. 
 The ASPEN card experience described above also reveals how immigrants from 
some backgrounds have very little experience with technologies, and are not familiar 
with how technology-enabled banking works. Volunteers therefore on occasion also 
have to help immigrants set-up bank accounts. The sense is often that banks are trying 
to find reasons to not accept immigrants as customers - the standards of evidence 
required to obtain a banking identity is often complex, difficult to understand, hard to 
obtain, and is not standardised.
Future Digital Identity Scheme - Aspirations, Hopes and Fears:
 The participants counselled that the introduction of a digital identity scheme 
had to be very carefully managed within immigration communities. The introduction of 
such a scheme has to be attentive to the precarities and vulnerabilities that immigrants 
can experience and the poor experiences that many of them have had with digital 
immigration systems in the UK and elsewhere for such a scheme to be successful. The 
precarities and vulnerabilities together with the poor experiences related here, mean 
that trust and confidence in a new digital identity system will be low - this will make 
compliance and use of the system less predictable. As a result, it is essential that such 
a service is supported by people that immigrants can talk to and that can support their 
use of a digital identity service. 
 A digital identity scheme applied to immigrants needs to be designed with the 
risks to immigrants in mind and a recognition that errors in applications for immigration 
status can be catastrophic for the applicant, with no option for redress or for claiming 
back the considerable sums of money that are sometimes spent. 
 A digital identity scheme needs to have a fair and transparent funding model 
attached to it, so that it is not perceived as a scheme that discriminates against 
particular groups, or that amplifies existing discriminations. A digital identity scheme 
must also be secure and the use of personal data needs to be ethical for the system 
to be trusted. The participants queried how possible it is to have a fair and transparent 
funding model, and with this, ethical use of data, when digital systems are often 
outsourced to many parties outside government. The current experience with existing 
digital immigration systems was that no one is seen to be responsible for ensuring 
that immigrants have fair and equitable access to the digital systems, and that a digital 
identity is not designed with the value to the immigrant in mind. 
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 From CIAC’s point of view, the realisation of one’s rights in a country is a means 
of empowerment - and enables the securing of a future in that country that has 
value both to the individual and to the land to which they have come. Such forms of 
empowerment provide autonomy and control for the individual, and thus any future 
digital identity scheme must also support and engender autonomy and control.
Visual Note:
 Please see page 7 for the full drawing by Claude Heath. This work is licensed under CC BY-
NC-ND 4.0. To view a copy of this license visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Future Digital Identity Scheme - 
CIAC
6
7
DIGITAL IDENTITY
GROUND-UP PERSPECTIVES
Intergenerational Women
Royal Holloway University of London
Short consultation programme on behalf of The Department for Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport (DCMS) on the topic of Digital Identity.
Lizzie Coles-Kemp Information Security Group
Claude Heath Department of Media Arts
September 2020
Introduction - 
Intergenerational Women
1
A team at Royal Holloway University of London was commissioned to run a short consultation programme on behalf of The Department for Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport (DCMS) on the topic of digital identity. DCMS commissioned a programme 
of 4 consultations to be undertaken with groups who are dependent on digital identities 
for use of essential services such as finance, welfare, health, housing and education. 
The purpose of the consultation was to provide input on the design of future digital 
identity schemes; in particular, who should run them and how to make them safe, 
inclusive and accessible. These consultations are part of a wider call for evidence on 
the topic of digital identity. 
 Each consultation session was split into two parts: (1). Everyday experiences 
of digital identity and the challenges faced when managing digital identity, and (2). 
Requirements for future digital identity schemes. 
 Due to COVID restrictions, the consultation sessions were held via Zoom. In order 
to retain the details about the complexity digital identity set-up and use in everyday life, 
Claude Heath visually illustrated the session using visual note-taking. 
 This is a report of the consultation session with an intergenerational group of 
women who rely on digital identity for receipt of essential services in a variety of ways. 
The views expressed are those of this participant group.
Participants - intergenerational women:
 4 participants between age 38 and 68 were recruited for this consultation group. 
All four met the criteria of being dependent on digital identities, either for themselves 
or for other people.  Two women were self-employed, one woman is retired and 
former business owner, two women have a second income stream from self-owned 
businesses. All participants are British passport holders, one passport holder is a dual 
citizen and one woman lives in France.
Everyday Experiences of Digital Identity:
 Examples were given of the need to use digital identities for shopping, banking, 
accessing health services and leisure activities. Examples were also given of where 
individuals advocated for or vouched for others who were in pursuit of a digital identity. 
All participants identified that there are bureaucratic challenges if the right paperwork 
is missing and/or an identity applicant struggles to follow the process. An example 
was given of trying to prove identity in order to obtain a replacement bank card. In this 
example, even if the applicant has the right paperwork, presenting that paperwork can 
be complicated and idiosyncratic. The group concluded that those applying for a digital 
identity or using a digital identity for essential core services have to be organised and 
patient. It also helps if there are friends and family as a support network to give advice 
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as to what to do or to help with the administrative processes. 
 It was noted that if someone is experiencing stress or anxiety, it can be extremely 
stressful and unpleasant to be asked to prove identity when challenged. It can also 
feel overwhelming to be constantly having to prove identity, and this can sometimes 
result in people dropping out of the identity process or limiting their options so as 
to avoid identity bureaucracy. This is particularly the case when the process seems 
unnecessarily complex or adversarial. 
 Finding the right source of proof can also be stress-inducing. For example, utility 
bills are often a proof of address for the person trying to prove their identity but the 
format that the bill comes in is not always right for the type of proof required. The 
named individual on the bill may also not identify the person claiming identity. There 
are also contradictions in the different processes for proving identity: for example, 
in person you may have to present several specific pieces of evidence to acquire a 
replacement bank card. But, via a banking app, you might only need to use your PIN to 
access the app and from there you can order a replacement card. 
 It was felt that the challenges facing older users sometimes go unacknowledged. 
Elderly groups can also struggle to verify their identity: these are groups that are less 
likely to have passports or driver’s licence. At the same time, elderly groups are being 
encouraged to use on-line services for day to day activities. Elderly access to digital 
services and proving who they are on-line is another example of where community 
support is needed, because often the elderly require care and support to carry out the 
digital bureaucratic processes, and support to make sure that they can continue to re-
validate their identities. 
 However, having a validated identity is only part of what is needed. These 
identities also have to be useful by enabling access to useful information or services. 
This means that the digital identity must access services that are useful and it is 
this that makes a digital identity valuable. An example was given of the NHS number 
– where everyone has a unique NHS number but providing this is not enough to 
get access to your own health data, change GP surgeries or to have medical data 
shared between two clinical teams, with an example given of someone with a serious 
condition who  personally has to carry her file from one consultation to the next. This 
was contrasted with Spain where a Spanish citizen has a unique identity number, this 
number does not have to be re-validated , gives you access to essential services and 
is also your Tax ID. Everyone in Spain is able, it was said, to quote their number from 
memory [it is compulsory to carry ID at all times]. A further example was given of where 
British citizens in Spain can encounter difficulties when selling a property, for example, 
as their passport number will have changed upon renewal over time and may no longer 
match the details on the deed of purchase. A Notary is then required to certify the 
identity of the British person with different passport numbers. The system in Spain 
might perhaps suit criminals who do not wish to have their Spanish Foreigner´s ID 
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(which does not change) linked to their current UK passport number.
 The attitudes towards digital identity vary depending on your experiences of 
identity, and of the safety and security of that identity. Examples were given of how 
older people might not be of the mindset that is necessary to take active steps to 
protect a digital identity and how, as a result, older people can easily be conned. This 
means that older people need to be suspicious of unsolicited offers of help and support 
but nevertheless still remain able to receive support. 
 The group discussed the pros and cons of a single identity: not only might a 
single digital identity be used for essential services but also for browsing, for shopping 
and for leisure activities (e.g. Netflix). However, whilst this might make life easier, 
it potentially makes you open to attack and manipulation and where attack and 
manipulation might be by the service provider itself as well as malicious third parties. 
Future Digital Identity Scheme - Aspirations, Hopes and Fears:
 In a notional future, the groups discussed the possibility of a basic identity for 
core, essential services that everyone needs access to. There might be additional 
services for which someone could use the identity but these would be additional 
identity services. 
 The group agreed that such an identity has to be secure, easy to use and be 
reliable for all people regardless of their competencies. The group argued that there 
has to be the right kind of support in place for those who need it to be able to make 
decisions regarding digital identity and for them to be able to use it fully. 
 Those who run the services have to be accountable and the ownership of these 
responsibilities has to be transparent. The sentiment was articulated that as a society 
we are being pushed down the digital access route but as individuals and as a society 
we need some control over how our identities are being handled. The managers of the 
identity systems should be accountable and responsible to us. If there is no control and 
transparency, then a future digital identity result in us being fed whatever an algorithm 
matches to us and we could lose control over our use of digital services. At present, 
there is a sense of taking back control when you deliberately wrong-foot the algorithm 
and remove cookies, making it think you are somewhere other than where you actually 
are, or interested in things that actually are of no relevance to you – that it knows very 
little about you. In a future scenario, the group argued that people have to have control 
over what algorithms know about you and who that is shared with. The algorithm has to 
work for the person rather than the person work for the algorithm. An often-used means 
that we can use to take back control is to set-up different identities and email accounts 
as a way to separate different areas of your life, e.g. business, personal, shopping. Any 
future identity system has to respect that people should be able to choose to have 
separate identities if they want to manage and live their lives in this way. 
 As stated at the start of this section, one possible model is to have a basic 
identity that everyone has, and this provides access to core services. This basic identity 
is underwritten by the government and is secured centrally by the government. The 
government can be trusted to do this because it runs the passport and driver’s licence 
systems. Optional add-on identity modules can be added to this basic identity, to cover 
the different spheres of people’s lives, shopping being one example given. These add-
ons may be run by trusted agents but the governance rules for those agents should 
be collectively decided and defined with the identity agents being fully accountable to 
those rules. The rules and algorithms have to clearly and transparently be seen to work 
for people, rather than the other way around. 
Visual Note:
 In the visual note on the next page, an identity that was core is placed at the 
centre of the note. Visually it is striking that the core identity becomes central to so 
many activities. It is also noticeable that the type of identity that you have controls what 
you have access to and therefore how you are seen by the system. How this picture is 
interpreted depends entirely on who has control. If third parties and the government 
have control and are not accountable to the identity holders, then this becomes a 
picture of barriers and challenges. If the identity holder has control, then this becomes 
a picture of possibilities and empowerment. 
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Please see page 5 for the full drawing by Claude Heath. This work is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 
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